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Abstract
We evaluate the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation accounting
for instabilities in the long-run money demand for the U.S. over the period 1900-2013. We
extend the analysis and reassess the results reported in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009), also
considering the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen
et al. (2015). Breaks in the long-run money demand give rise to regime-dependent welfare
cost estimates. We find that the welfare cost is about 0.1% of annual income over 1976-2013,
as compared to 0.8% over 1945-1975. Overall, these values are substantially lower than those
reported in the literature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this paper is to measure the welfare cost of inflation for the U.S. in the
money demand framework developed by Lucas (2000) and in presence of potentially detected
instabilities in the underlying money demand function. The evaluation is undertaken by
mapping changes in the structural parameters of the money demand function (mainly changes
in the interest-elasticity) to the measures of the welfare cost of inflation. According to Lucas
(2000), the welfare cost of inflation can be defined as the social gain/utility obtained by
reducing the steady-state nominal interest rate from a positive level to the near-zero level,
as prescribed by the Friedman (1969)’s optimal monetary policy rule. Using U.S. data for
the period 1900-1994, Lucas (2000) shows that the reduction of the annual inflation rate from
10% to 0% would imply a welfare gain of 1% of income. This result supports the view of
strong intervention of monetary authorities targeting anti-inflationary policies. Lucas (2000)’
contribution has generated an interesting line of theoretical research on this topic (Simonsen
and Cysne, 2001; Cysne and Turchick, 2012). However, empirical contributions (see, for
instance, Chadha et al., 1998, Bali, 2000, and Serletis and Yavari, 2004) have focused on
the case of stable money demand to evaluate the welfare cost in the U.S., although evidence
of historical instability has been reported in the literature (Ball, 2001; Ireland, 2009; Wang,
2011). In particular, the instability of money demand detected at the out-turn of the 70s
and the 80s has been interpreted either as changes in the economy’s transaction technology
(Ball, 2001; Teles and Zhou, 2005; Ireland, 2009; Berentsen et al., 2015) or as the outcome
of financial reforms and monetary policies triggered by high inflation rates (Reynard, 2004;
Lucas and Nicolini, 2015). In both cases, the money demand approach advocated by Lucas
(2000), which accounts for the money demand distortion brought about by positive nominal
interest rates, appears a valid instrument to analyze the welfare cost of inflation (Ireland,
2009).1 Hence, this calls for a reconsideration of the welfare cost of inflation when the
economy moves from a regime of sustained inflation to another of moderate inflation as at
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the end of the 70s, or even in correspondence of a situation close to the “Friedman rule” as
in most recent years, and vice-versa.
In this paper, we address these issues in our implementation of a welfare cost analysis for
the U.S. Motivated by the existing literature, we estimate money demand equations using a
dataset of yearly observations from 1900 to 2013.2 Our contribution focuses on the selection
of the best empirical model through a cointegration analysis accounting for the presence of
regime changes, that we identify via the implementation of the testing procedure proposed
by Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010). We estimate long-run money demand models in a
single-equation framework and we provide welfare cost estimates accounting for changes in
the structural parameters of the money demand function. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first contribution that measures the effect of structural instability of money demand
on the welfare cost of inflation.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find evidence of two structural breaks on
the parameters of the long-run money demand relationship, located at the mid-40s and at
the end of the 70s. According to our estimates, the interest-elasticity of money demand
increased during the post-war from −0.1 to −0.4, but the demand curve shifted downward
and became less elastic afterwards. These results are overall consistent with those reported
by Ball (2001) and Ireland (2009) on U.S. data, as well as with the prediction implied by
the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen et al. (2015).
Second, once regimes are accounted for, welfare cost estimates are substantially lower than
those reported in the literature. For instance, Lucas (2000) finds a value of 1% as opposite
to a value of 0.5% in this paper, where the value drops to 0.1% in most recent decades. This
means that the target of moderate inflation dictated implicitly or explicitly by the Federal
Reserve (FED) would have implied very limited welfare costs to the U.S. economy in latest
years.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review
the relevant seminal contributions on the issue of measuring the welfare cost of inflation.
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We also discuss the implication of the specification of the money demand function and the
computation of the welfare cost. In Section 3, we describe the dataset and we report the
empirical results on the selection of the specification of the cointegrating relationship where
structural breaks are accounted for. Section 4 evaluates the impact of the instability of the
money demand model on the welfare cost estimates. Section 5 concludes.
2. MONEY DEMAND AND THE WELFARE COST OF INFLATION
2.1. Welfare cost measures
Let us define m(r) the money demand function, r the nominal interest rate, and ψ(m) the
inverse demand function. In what follows, we consider the following measures of the welfare
cost of inflation, based on the money demand approach developed by Bailey (1956) and Fried-
man (1969) and further popularized by Lucas (2000): the Bailey (1956) partial-equilibrium






−ρm′(ρ)dρ, corresponding to the area un-
der ψ(m); the Lucas (2000) general-equilibrium formula derived from a simplified Sidrauski






m′(r), with w(0) = 0; and the Lucas (2000) general-equilibrium formula
derived from a McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) shopping-time framework, s(r), obtained
as solution to the differential equation s′(r) = − rm′(r)(1−s(r))
1−s(r)+rm(r) , with s(0) = 0. A detailed
overview of these measures is reported in Mogliani and Urga (2017).
As shown by Simonsen and Cysne (2001) and Cysne and Turchick (2012), the welfare
cost measures considered above do not have any obvious closed-form solution, but they
can be conveniently arranged in an ascending order and hence approximated by a bounded
interval. First, consider the welfare cost measure arising from the Sidrauski framework,
w(r), which is equivalent to an increase in income necessary to leave the representative
household indifferent between the current positive steady-state nominal interest rate and
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the optimal policy a` la Friedman (1969) (r = 0). Taking as reference a zero steady-state
nominal interest rate, the welfare cost of inflation is equivalent to the decrease in income
necessary to leave the household indifferent between the current optimal policy and r > 0,





dµ. Second, the measure











dρ = 1 − e−A(r). It turns out that
s(r) can be accurately approximated by A(r), and it follows that A(r) < B(r). Further,




dµ, leading to A(r) = w(r), i.e. the same





−ψ(m(ρ))m′(ρ)dρ ≡ ∫ r
0
−ρm′(ρ)dρ, for ρ ∈ (0, r], it follows that B(r) < w(r). An
inequality chain can then be formed to order the measures considered:
w(r) = A(r) < s(r) < A(r) < B(r) < w(r), (1)
so that for a given r the width of the region of cost estimates is given by R(r) = w(r)−w(r)
and the relative percentage difference is given by D(r) = w(r)/w(r)− 1.
2.2. Money demand specification
The specification of the money demand function m(r) is crucial in determining the ac-
curate size of the welfare cost of inflation. Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) consider two
standard competing empirical specifications, namely the semi-log and the log-log. The for-
mer, derived from the class of inventory-theoretic models (Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956; Miller
and Orr, 1966; Bar-Ilan, 1990), relates the natural logarithm of the money-income ratio m
to the level of the nominal interest rate r (Cagan, 1956), and implies an increasing interest-
elasticity of real balances, meaning that as r increases real balances converge to zero, and a
finite satiation point as r → 0. The latter, a direct development of the theoretical solution
proposed, for instance, in Sidrauski (1967), Brock (1974) and McCallum and Goodfriend
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(1987), relates the natural logarithm of m to the natural logarithm of r (Meltzer, 1963), and
implies a constant interest-elasticity. Thus, the shape of the welfare cost function depends
on the specification of m(r): the semi-log specification implies a bounded concave (upwards
to downwards) function of the interest rate, while the log-log specification implies an un-
bounded strictly concave function. This means that the money demand specification must
be accurately chosen in order to fit the data properly and avoid miscalculation of the cost
of inflation. Following Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009), we choose the log-log specification
which fits quite well the historical annual U.S. data used in the present empirical analysis
(see also Bae and De Jong, 2007). With the log-log specification, the implied money demand
function is m = exp(α)rβ, where α is the constant and β the interest-elasticity of money
demand (expected to be negative), and the theoretical bounds of the welfare cost region
defined by the inequality (1) have the following closed-form solutions:
w(r) = 1− (1 + exp(α)r1−|β|) |β||β|−1 (2a)
w(r) = −1 + (1− exp(α)r1−|β|) |β||β|−1 (2b)
It is worth noting that real solutions for w(r) can be obtained only for r ∈ [0, exp(α) 1|β|−1 ],
which represents a realistic economic interval for reasonable values of α and β. It follows
that the width of the region of cost estimates R(r) has also a bounded real solution, which is
strictly increasing in r with R′(r) > 0 and R′′(r) > 0. The relative percentage welfare cost
difference D(r) (which, for the log-log specification, can be well approximated by w(r)/|β|
for reasonable values of r; see Cysne and Turchick, 2012) has also a bounded real solution
and is strictly increasing in r, where D′(r) > 0 but D′′(r) ≷ 0.
In the next section we estimate a long-run money demand specification for the U.S. and
we investigate the presence of long-run instabilities in a cointegrating framework. We will
then make use of the relevant estimated parameters to map a correct measure of the welfare
cost of inflation.
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3. MONEYDEMAND FOR THE U.S.: DATA AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
3.1. The dataset
For the empirical analysis, we extended to 2013 the dataset used by Ireland (2009),
which in turn is closely comparable to that of Lucas (2000). We have T = 114 annual
observations spanning from 1900 to 2013 for money, income and interest rates. Money is
measured in terms of M1, which includes mainly currency held by the public, non-interest-
bearing demand deposits, and, since 1980, interest-bearing Negotiable Order of Withdrawal
(NOW) accounts. Further, we follow the recent literature (Ireland, 2009; Berentsen et al.,
2015) and we consider a retail sweep adjusted measure of money from 1994 onward, in order
to avoid a downward estimate of M1 consistent with the introduction of retail deposit sweep
programs (Dutkowsky and Cynamon, 2003). Income is measured in terms of nominal GDP,
computed as the real GDP multiplied by the series of implicit deflators for GNP (from 1900
to 1928) and GDP (from 1929 onward). Finally, the interest rate series is constructed using
data on the six-month commercial paper rate (from 1900 to 1997) and the three-month
AA nonfinancial commercial paper rate (from 1998 onward), due to a discontinuity in the
statistical publication of the former. The data sources are broadly the same as in Ireland
(2009), and we hence refer the reader to that contribution for further details.
3.2. Searching for cointegration: long-run instability and structural changes
A cointegrating relationship between ln(m) and ln(r) is estimated using the Dynamic OLS
estimator (Saikkonen, 1991; Stock and Watson, 1993) to account for potential endogeneity of
the interest rate, with the number of leads and lags (`T = 4) set consistently with the upper
bound condition implied by the data-dependent rule suggested by Saikkonen (1991), i.e.
`T < T
1/3 ≈ 5 for T = 114.3 Heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors are
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obtained through the Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West truncated automatic bandwidth






ln(rt) + ˆt (3)
where the interest-elasticity of the money-income ratio is close to, although somewhat below,
the result of −0.5 consistent with a Baumol-Tobin transaction technology and reported
by Meltzer (1963) and Lucas (2000). However, a formal test of cointegration based on ˆt
(Shin, 1994) strongly rejects the null hypothesis of stationary residuals (at 1% significance
level), suggesting that the estimated relationship does not cointegrate.4 The first important
implication for the subsequent analysis is that welfare cost results, as reported by Lucas
(2000) and then discussed by Ireland (2009), might be contaminated by the inconsistencies
arising from the long-run relationship between ln(m) and ln(r) which does not cointegrate.
In contrast with the literature published in the 80s and the 90s (Lucas, 1988; Hoffman
and Rasche, 1991; Stock and Watson, 1993), recent empirical studies have pointed out the
presence of structural instability in the money demand parameters for the U.S., especially
when the estimation sample includes data from the 90s onward (Ball, 2001; Teles and Zhou,
2005; Wang, 2011). This intuition is confirmed by inspecting Figure 1, which plots long-run
money demand curves obtained fitting the data with parameters both used by Lucas (2000)
and estimated using (3): most of the observations from the 80s onward (see Ireland, 2009),
as well as a large number of points located at the center of the plot, seem consistent with
different theoretical curves.
Thus, a natural follow up of the above results is to test for cointegration in presence of
structural changes. To this purpose, we implement the Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010)
testing procedure (supF and UDmaxF tests) and we allow both the intercept and the
interest-elasticity to change over time/alternative regimes, where the break dates are se-
quentially estimated via a dynamic programming algorithm (Bai and Perron, 2003). We
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find robust evidence of n = 2 structural breaks (i.e. n + 1 = 3 regimes), at 1945 and 1976
(details on both the implemented approach and the results are reported in Mogliani and
Urga, 2017). Interestingly, these findings are broadly consistent with those reported by Ball
(2001), who identifies a post-war and a post-82 regimes.5
Equation (4) reports the estimated cointegrating Dynamic OLS regression (3) with the
selected breaks included (standard errors in parenthesis; leads-and-lags omitted):
ln(mt) = −1.64
(0.07)
ιt1 − 0.13(0.02) ln(rt1)− 2.83(0.06)ιt2 − 0.43(0.02) ln(rt2)− 2.24(0.06)ιt3 − 0.11(0.02) ln(rt3) + ˆt, (4)
where ιti is a regime-dependent intercept, ti = Ti−1 < t ≤ Ti, with i = 1, . . . , n + 1, and
by convention T0 = 0 and Tn+1 = T . The results suggest that the interest-elasticity of the
money-income ratio increased from −0.13 in the pre-war period to −0.43 up to the 80s, and
then decreased back again to a low −0.11 in the last part of the sample.6 Further, a formal
test of cointegration with breaks (Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sanso`, 2006; Arai and Kurozumi,
2007) does not reject the null of stationary residuals at any standard significance level when
exact critical values are used (at 10% level with asymptotic critical values), after controlling
for initial conditions in the residuals vector. Figure 2 plots the long-run money demand
curves obtained by fitting the data with parameters estimated from our structural breaks
regression, and it provides strong evidence of the downward shift of the money demand curve
in the last regime. As expected, our findings on the interest-elasticity for the pre-war period
are in line with those reported, for instance, by Stock and Watson (1993) and Ball (2001).
The estimated elasticity for the third regime is also close to that reported by Ireland (2009),
although his specification involves quarterly data spanning from 1980 to 2006. The higher
elasticity observed in the post-war period up to the mid-70s is a novel result, reflecting the
transition from low to high velocity of money driven by changes in the transaction technology
such as the creation of near-monies instruments, which is in turn consistent with a rise in the
degree of substitution between real balances and alternative assets.7 Furthermore, our results
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seem also consistent with the predictions implied by the recent theoretical contributions of
Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen et al. (2015).8
4. INSTABILITY INMONEYDEMANDANDWELFARE COST ESTIMATES
FOR THE U.S.
We provided robust econometric evidence of an unstable money demand specification
attributed to changes in the structural parameters of the long-run relationship between real
balances and interest rates. An interesting but completely unexplored field is represented by
the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation in presence of instabilities
in the money demand function. Thus, we now turn to the evaluation of the welfare cost of
inflation for the U.S. using the theoretical bounds of the welfare cost region represented by
w(r) and w(r), which can be computed from closed-form solutions (2a) and (2b) and from
the estimated calibration parameters (αˆ and βˆ). Moreover, it is reasonable to account for
the uncertainty affecting the estimated parameters when computing welfare cost estimates.
To this purpose, we consider the confidence region of w(r) and w(r) using the 90% level
confidence values for αˆ and βˆ. This requires the construction of confidence intervals using
the Bonferroni inequality, i.e. α˜ = αˆ±Bσα and β˜ = βˆ±Bσβ with B the Bonferroni multiple
and σ the standard error. Hence, lower and upper bound analogs of w(r) and w(r), that is
w(r)− and w(r)+, are computed using these joint confidence bounds.
The results are compared to the benchmark values provided by the welfare cost estimates
reported by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009). Moreover, in this paper we extend their analysis
by computing intervals for welfare cost estimates, based on both historical values for nominal
and real interest rates and alternative counterfactual scenarios. We compute sample-specific
averages of the nominal interest rate (r¯), the inflation rate (p¯i) and the implicit real interest
rate (ρ¯). Results are reported in Panel A of Table 1. According to the values of the calibration
parameters reported by Lucas (2000), average interest and inflation rates computed over the
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sample 1900-1994 (4.6% and 3.1%, respectively, leading to ρ¯ = 1.5%) imply an average cost
of inflation of about 1.0− 1.1% of income. This value is very close to what we would obtain
if we assume that the steady-state real interest rate (ρss) ranges between 3% and 5% under
a policy of price stability. Under a policy of positive inflation matching the average inflation
rate, the cost of positive nominal rates (6.1% and 8.1%, respectively) would range instead
between 1.2% and 1.4% of income. Finally, assuming ρss = 3% would imply a cost of 1.1%
of income for a policy of 2% inflation, and 1.7−1.8% of income for a policy of 10% inflation.
All in all, the results based on the calibration reported by Lucas (2000) suggest that the
welfare cost of inflation for the U.S. should range between 1% and 2% of GDP.
We now turn to welfare cost estimates based on the cointegrating regression performed
over the sample 1900-2013 and the calibration parameters reported in (3). The results,
reported in Panel B of Table 1, suggest the welfare cost of inflation for the U.S. should range
between 0.3% and 1.4% of GDP. Hence, cost estimates based on regression (3) are fairly
low compared to those reported in Panel A of Table 1. These are very important findings
that suggest a different quantitative interpretation, with respect to the estimates reported
by Lucas (2000), of the welfare gain implied by the Friedman rule for the U.S. We thus
recommend at a first stance a downward revision of those benchmark estimates.
4.1. Welfare cost of inflation and regime changes
Let us now consider welfare cost estimates based on the cointegrating regression with
regime changes performed over the sample 1900-2013 and the calibration parameters reported
in (4). Results are reported in Table 2. Average interest rates do not differ substantially in
the first two regimes (3.7% in 1900-1944 and 3.9% in 1945-1975), but the high policy rates
observed by the end of the 70s and during the first-half of the 80s leads to a somewhat higher
average in the last regime (5.5%). It is worth noting that latest years have been characterized
by historically low interest rates, consistently with the easing policy set by the FED in the
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aftermath of the Great Recession episode. Inflation is about 1.9% in the first regime, but
almost doubled in the second and third regimes (3.8% and 3.3%, respectively). The low
average inflation observed in the first regime is mainly due to a few deflationary episodes in
the 20s and the 30s. On the other hand, recent years have been characterized by a moderate
inflation (around 2%) consistent with the implicit (and explicit since 2012) target of the FED
(Goodfriend, 2004). It follows that the average real interest rate is around 2% in both the
first and last regime (1.8% and 2.2%), but it is very low in the intermediate regime (0.1%).
The results suggest that the implied cost of inflation is about 0.1 − 0.2% in the first and
third regimes, and 0.6 − 0.8% in the second regime. Assuming a steady-state real interest
rate ranging between 3% and 5%, a policy of price stability would cost the economy about
0.1 − 0.2% of income in the first and third regimes, and about 0.5 − 0.9% of income in the
second regime. Under a policy of positive inflation matching p¯i, the cost of positive nominal
rates would be about 0.2 − 0.4% of income in the first regime, 0.8 − 1.2% of income in the
second regime, and 0.1 − 0.2% in the third regime. Finally, assuming ρss = 3%, a policy
of 2% inflation would imply a cost of 0.2 − 0.3% of income in the first regime, 0.7 − 0.9%
in the second regime, and 0.1% in the third regime. A policy of 10% inflation would cost
the economy 0.4− 0.6% of income in the first regime, 1.2− 1.5% in the second regime, and
0.1− 0.3% in the third regime. These findings lead to several interesting conclusions.
First, the size of the cost of inflation for the first and third regimes is broadly compa-
rable across scenarios, which means that the two regimes share some long-term equilibrium
features. This is likely related to the fact that the money demand function displays an
interest-elasticity which is virtually the same in these two regimes. Of course, striking differ-
ences arise from the level of money-income ratio, which is around 30% on average during the
pre-war period and only 15% from the late 70s onward. This means that for high interest
rates (not considered in Table 2) welfare cost estimates are nevertheless expected to diverge.
Second, for moderate interest rates our welfare cost estimates are overall substantially lower
than those reported by Lucas (2000). Infrequently exceeding 1%, they rather float mostly
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around 0.4 − 0.5%, dropping to 0.1% in most recent decades, suggesting that the priors on
the welfare gain implied by the Friedman rule for the U.S. might be substantially revised
downward. Third, from an approximate decomposition, we can calculate the contribution
of changes in the interest-elasticity of money demand to changes in the welfare cost across
regimes. This amounts to about 60% of the (positive) change from the first to the second
regime, and about 90% of the (negative) change from the second to the third regime. Fourth,
the policy of 2% inflation, dictated implicitly or explicitly in the last two decades by the
FED, seems to imply limited welfare costs to the economy: between 0.05% and 0.1%, de-
pending on the assumed steady-state real interest rate. However, after almost three decades
of sustained real rates, the monetary policy response to the Great Recession drove nominal
interest rates to very low territory, while inflation kept around 1.5%. Thus, the economy has
been facing negative real rates since 2009. This policy being not sustainable in the long-run,
it is reasonable to expect nominal rates to rise again in the next years. Finally, compared
to the literature, our findings are interestingly close to the quantitative results reported by
Ireland (2009) and Calza and Zaghini (2011) on the post-80s period, as well to estimates
obtained from calibration of theoretical models reported by Cooley and Hansen (1991), Faig
and Jerez (2007), and Berentsen et al. (2015), among others. However, they are overall
below the estimates reported in Fischer (1981), Lucas (1981), Craig and Rocheteau (2008),
and Gupta and Majumdar (2014).
4.2. Welfare cost of inflation in presence of interest-bearing assets
As mentioned in Section 3, technological innovations and new regulations have increased
the liquidity of interest-bearing deposits in the last decades. Thus, in an economy charac-
terized by the presence of these financial technologies, the welfare cost measures presented
in Section 2 may be misleading, because they do not account for the existence of a possible
trade-off between more liquid non interest-bearing and less liquid interest-bearing monies
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(Bali, 2000; Cysne, 2003; Cysne and Turchick, 2010, 2012). Neglecting the existence of
interest-bearing monetary assets may hence result in a bias in the evaluation of the welfare
costs of inflation.
In this section, we provide an evaluation of this bias by implementing the approach
described by Cysne and Turchick (2010). For ease of exposition, we limit our analysis to the
simple case of two groups of monetary assets, non-interest and interest bearing. We consider a
Cobb-Douglas monetary-aggregator technology, with unit constant elasticity of substitution
between the assets. Further, we assume that the interest-elasticity of the demand for non-
interest bearing assets and the elasticity of substitution between the monetary assets and
the consumption good (ν) in the utility function of the household are both less than 1.
These assumptions are quite realistic and not unusual in theoretical monetary models, as
they jointly imply a positive interest-elasticity of the demand for interest bearing assets. It
is worth noting that these assumptions also imply that the unidimensional measures of the
welfare costs of inflation are expected to be biased upward in presence of interest bearing
monetary assets. Accordingly, considering the Bailey (1956)’s measure of the welfare cost of





where θ is the relative share of the non-interest bearing asset in the Cobb-Douglas monetary-
aggregator. We evaluate the bias Ω(r) by building on the empirical unidimensional results
obtained for the last regime estimated in our sample, which is consistent with the presence
in the economy of monetary assets used for transaction purposes, beyond currency, paying
different interest rates. Further, we consider the benchmark case of a real interest rate at
3% and a policy of 2% inflation, implying a nominal interest rate at 5%, which is fairly close
to actual average observations for the last regime, as reported in Table 2.
According to the unidimensional Bailey (1956)’s measure, we evaluate the welfare cost of
inflation to 0.10% of output for the last regime, for simplicity neglecting parameters uncer-
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tainty. When we consider the bidimensional framework described above, the overestimation
bias Ω(r) is in the range of 140% and 13%, for combinations of reasonable values for ν and
θ in the range of 0.3 and 0.7. Accordingly, the “unbiased” welfare cost of inflation would
range between 0.04% and 0.09%. These results are very close to those reported in Panel C
of Table 2, representing an additional evidence of the low welfare cost of inflation identified
for the last regime, as commented in Section 4.1.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we evaluated the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of
inflation accounting for instabilities in the long-run money demand for the U.S. over the
period 1900-2013. We extended the analysis and reassessed the results reported in Lucas
(2000) and Ireland (2009), also in the light of the recent contributions by Lucas and Nicolini
(2015) and Berentsen et al. (2015).
We estimated a long-run money demand specification that cointegrates only when breaks
are accounted for. We then evaluated the costs to the economy of inflationary policies under
the assumption of regime changes and we found out that the existing empirical evaluations,
based on likely misspecified money demand models, tend to overestimate the welfare cost of
inflation. In particular, we found evidence of two statistically significant structural breaks
(in 1945 and 1976) affecting the long-run money demand relationship. According to our
estimates, the interest-elasticity of money demand increased during the post-war from −0.1
to −0.4, but the demand curve shifted downward and became less elastic afterwards. These
results are consistent with those reported by Ball (2001) and Ireland (2009) on U.S. data,
as well as with the prediction implied by the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas and
Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen et al. (2015). Once regimes are accounted for, welfare cost
estimates appear substantially lower than those reported, for instance, in Lucas (2000):
usually around 0.5%, but only up to 0.1% in most recent decades. This means that the
15
target of moderate inflation dictated implicitly or explicitly by the FED would have implied
very limited welfare costs to the U.S. economy in latest years.
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Notes
1It is worth noting that the latter interpretation could imply an underestimate of the cost to the post-1980
U.S. economy. According to Dotsey and Ireland (1996), in general equilibrium, the inflation tax distorts
a variety of marginal decisions, such as the holding of real cash balances and the allocation of productive
resources, which are small taken individually but yield to fairly large welfare cost estimates when combined.
Thus, Ireland (2009) argues that if these inefficiencies remain present in the post-1980 U.S. economy, the
welfare cost could be underestimated by the measures considered in the present paper. However, according
to Cysne (2003) and Cysne and Turchick (2010), the presence in the economy of monetary assets used for
transaction purposes, beyond currency, paying different interest rates, may instead lead to an overestimate
of the welfare cost of inflation (see Section 4.2). We thank the referees for raising this point.
2The dataset cannot be updated to more recent years, as in 2012 the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System discontinued the publication of the retail deposit sweeps data (last observation available:
December 2013), which enter the monetary aggregate used in this paper (sweep-adjusted M1).
3Preliminary analysis, performed through a battery of unit-root tests (Ng and Perron, 2001), confirms
that the null hypothesis of unit-root cannot be rejected for both series. See details in Mogliani and Urga
(2017).
4Similar conclusions are obtained by restricting the sample to the period 1900-1994, the same time span
considered by Lucas (2000). The interest-elasticity is estimated to −0.4, but regression residuals confirm no
cointegration. Further, we tested whether the estimated parameters reported in (3) are statistically different
from those reported by Lucas (2000). From a Wald test on the joint hypothesis that α0 = −3.02 and
β0 = −0.5, we can reject the null at less than 1% level. When the hypothesis on the interest-elasticity is
tested alone, we can reject the null at 1% level.
5Carlson et al. (2000) find a stable long-run money demand, based upon monthly data of the Money-
zero-maturity aggregate (Motley, 1988; Poole, 1991) over 1964-1998, only when the estimation sample is
restricted to start in 1976.
6For the second regime, the estimated coefficients are close to those reported by Lucas (2000). However,
we again reject at less than 1% level both the joint null hypothesis α0 = −3.02 and β0 = −0.5 and the simple
hypothesis on the interest-elasticity. Thus, we can conclude that in our long-run analysis (with or without
breaks) there is no statistical evidence in favor of the Baumol-Tobin transaction technology advocated by
Meltzer (1963) and Lucas (2000).
7A downward trend in the velocity of money is often explained by a decrease in the income-elasticity of
real balances from unity to 0.5. Lucas (2000) suggests that a technical change in the provision of transactions
services would produce a downward trend in the money-income ratio.
8Lucas and Nicolini (2015) refer explicitly to the regulatory changes on the banking sector implied by
Regulation Q, in force from 1933 to 2011, which explicitly banned interest payments on checkable deposits.
The authors find that the interest-elasticity of real money balances in the regulated economy is higher than
in the free-market economy. Berentsen et al. (2015) suggest instead that the introduction of retail deposit
sweep programs in the first half of the 90s reduces the interest-elasticity (agents earn higher rates on their
idle balances) and shifts downward the demand curve (the money stock is allocated more efficiently).
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Table 1: Welfare cost estimates: no structural changes models
Panel A. Lucas (2000) money demand parameters
ρss r pi w(r) w(r) R(r) D(r)
3.0 3.0 0.0 0.84 0.85 0.01 1.70
5.0 5.0 0.0 1.08 1.10 0.02 2.21
1.5 4.6 3.1 1.03 1.06 0.02 2.11
3.0 6.1 3.1 1.19 1.22 0.03 2.43
5.0 8.1 3.1 1.37 1.41 0.01 2.81
3.0 5.0 2.0 1.08 1.10 0.02 2.21
3.0 13.0 10.0 1.73 1.79 0.06 3.58
Panel B. Regression (3) estimated parameters
ρss r pi w(r)
− w(r)+ R(r) D(r)
3.0 3.0 0.0 0.25 0.62 0.37 152.33
5.0 5.0 0.0 0.36 0.82 0.45 125.02
1.4 4.3 2.9 0.32 0.75 0.43 132.39
3.0 5.9 2.9 0.41 0.89 0.48 117.08
5.0 7.9 2.9 0.51 1.04 0.53 103.52
3.0 5.0 2.0 0.36 0.82 0.45 125.02
3.0 13.0 10.0 0.75 1.36 0.62 82.63
Notes: values reported are expressed in percentage points. Values in italic denote the empirical
average over the estimation period.
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Table 2: Welfare cost estimates: structural changes model
Panel A. 1900-1944 regime
ρss r pi w(r)
− w(r)+ R(r) D(r)
3.0 3.0 0.0 0.10 0.18 0.08 76.57
5.0 5.0 0.0 0.16 0.28 0.12 71.61
1.8 3.7 1.9 0.12 0.22 0.09 74.59
3.0 4.9 1.9 0.16 0.27 0.11 71.84
5.0 6.9 1.9 0.22 0.37 0.15 68.85
3.0 5.0 2.0 0.16 0.28 0.12 71.61
3.0 13.0 10.0 0.38 0.63 0.25 64.38
Panel B. 1945-1975 regime
ρss r pi w(r)
− w(r)+ R(r) D(r)
3.0 3.0 0.0 0.51 0.69 0.18 34.61
5.0 5.0 0.0 0.70 0.91 0.21 30.54
0.1 3.9 3.8 0.60 0.79 0.19 32.57
3.0 6.8 3.8 0.84 1.08 0.24 28.26
5.0 8.8 3.8 0.98 1.24 0.26 26.43
3.0 5.0 2.0 0.70 0.91 0.21 30.54
3.0 13.0 10.0 1.24 1.53 0.30 23.85
Panel C. 1976-2013 regime
ρss r pi w(r)
− w(r)+ R(r) D(r)
3.0 3.0 0.0 0.04 0.09 0.05 146.41
5.0 5.0 0.0 0.06 0.14 0.08 137.15
2.2 5.5 3.3 0.06 0.15 0.09 135.45
3.0 6.3 3.3 0.07 0.17 0.10 133.21
5.0 8.3 3.3 0.09 0.22 0.12 128.71
3.0 5.0 2.0 0.06 0.14 0.08 137.15
3.0 13.0 10.0 0.14 0.32 0.17 121.98
Notes: See Table 1.
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